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STRIKING A BALANCE: ENSURING THE SAFETY
AND EFFICACY OF A DRUG'S USE, WHILE
RECOGNIZING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION OF TRUTHFUL, NON-MISLEADING
OFF-LABEL DRUG COMMUNICATIONS
HANNAH SMOOT COMBS*
"[Flear that speech might persuade provides no
lawful basis for quieting it.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Food and Drug Administration's ("FDA") broad
construction of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), current
regulations greatly restrict the ability of pharmaceutical firms to en-
gage in communications with physicians concerning a drug's off-
label indications-or uses that have not received FDA approval.2 Ac-
cording to FDA regulations, "labeling" includes not only the official
label on a drug's packaging or its accompanying advertisements, but
also brochures, detailing pieces, letters, sound recordings, and other
"printed, audio, or visual matter descriptive of a drug."3 Labeling that
is false or misleading is considered "misbranded" and therefore sub-
ject to prosecution.4 Given the FDA's pervasive regulation of a drug's
off-label indications, the distinction between illegal promotion of off-
label uses and legal, off-label communications remains unclear.
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2017; Staff
Member, First Amendment Law Review.
I Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670 (2011).
2 See Stephanie M. Greene & Lars Noah, Off-Label Drug Promotion and the First
Amendment, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 239 (2014),
http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/162-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-239.pdf.
3 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(2) (2015); see Joan H. Krause, Off-Label Drug Promotion
and the Ephemeral Line Between Marketing and Education, J.L. Biosci. (2015),
http://jlb.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/11/17/jlb.Isv052.full.
4 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2012).
As the FDA attempts to further restrict off-label communica-
tions, the pharmaceutical industry has raised concerns about the
constitutionality of the FDA's actions. Undoubtedly, the FDA has a re-
sponsibility to protect patients from the potential harm caused by
ingesting medications for uses that are not scientifically supported.
This responsibility, however, does not preclude the constitutional
guarantee that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the free-
dom of speech,"5 a guarantee courts have interpreted to include the
protection of commercial speech.6
A Second Circuit holding in favor of pharmaceutical compa-
nies' right to engage in truthful, non-misleading off-label promotion
has provided the Supreme Court with a blueprint for preserving the
First Amendment protection of commercial speech.7 Given the Se-
cond Circuit's position, it may be time for the FDA to consider
whether current FDA regulations truly serve the best interests of the
public.
This Note examines the Second Circuit's recent expansion of
the First Amendment to include the protection of truthful, non-
misleading speech promoting off-label uses of FDA approved drugs.
Part II provides a brief historical background of the policy reasons
behind the FDA's more stringent regulations. Part III discusses the
prevalence of current off-label practices within the healthcare indus-
try and the ethical concerns associated with pharmaceutical compa-
nies engaging in off-label promotion. Part IV outlines the pertinent
commercial speech case law that has shaped the First Amendment
discussion surrounding off-label communications, including the Se-
cond Circuit decision in United States v. Caronia,8 which led to the re-
cent district court decision in Amarin Pharma Inc. v. United States
FDA.9 Part V discusses the implications of the Amarin decision, and
furthermore questions whether a constitutional analysis is the ap-
s U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6 See, e.g., Cent Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980);
Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976);
Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D.D.C. 1999).
7 See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
8See id. at 160.
9 See Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. FDA, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103944 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 7, 2015).
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propriate legal method for resolving cases involving FDA regulation
of off-label uses. Part VI encourages the FDA to adopt alternative
methods of drug regulation that do not violate the First Amendment.
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP
The FDA's overly restrictive methods of drug regulation'O
have evolved in response to growing concern over an unchecked
pharmaceutical industry." This concern escalated in 1937 when
over one hundred individuals were poisoned by ingesting Elixir Sul-
fanilamide, a new drug formulation created for the treatment of
streptococcal infections.12 Unbeknownst to prescribing physicians,
this new formulation contained Diethylene Glycol, a chemical used in
antifreeze.13 In response to this tragic event, Congress created the
FDCA to "protect the health and safety of the public by preventing
10 For further commentary about the FDA's overly restrictive measures, see
James Copland & Paul Howard, Off-Label, Not Off-Limits: The FDA Needs to Cre-
ate a Safe Harbor for Off-Label Drug Use, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POL'Y RES., ISSUE
BRIEF No. 15 (Dec. 2012), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/ib_15.pdf
("[T]he FDA needs to rethink its off-label speech regulations, which have be-
come overly broad and unnecessarily opaque."); Richard Epstein, Government
Regulation of the Practice of Medicine: How the FDA Overreaches the Regulation




11 See, e.g., Ed Silverman, Does Pharma Money Mix With Cash Receptors in Your
Doctor's Wallet?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 9, 2015),
http://blogs.wsj.com/pharmalot/2015/02/09/does-pharma-money-mix-with-
cash-receptors-in-your-doctors-wallet/; Bernard Munos, We The People vs. The
Pharmaceutical Industry, FORBEs (Apr. 29, 3013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmunos/2013/04/29/the-
pharmaceutical-industry-vs-society/#4721eb253d0d.
12 See Carol Ballentine, Taste of Raspberries, Taste of Death: The 1937 Elixir Sul-
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deleterious, adulterated, or misbranded articles from entering inter-
state commerce."14
The original purpose of the FDCA was to ensure the safety of
a drug's marketed use, but in 1962 Congress enacted the Kefauver-
Harris Amendment, or the "Drug Efficacy Amendments," additionally
requiring pharmaceutical companies to prove the efficacy of a drug's
intended use.15 Thereinafter, once a pharmaceutical company suc-
cessfully provides the FDA with sufficient evidence of the safety and
efficacy of a drug's use, only FDA approved uses may be included in
the drug's labeling.16 "Labeling" includes not only a drug's packaging,
but also the printed, audio, and visual communications utilized by
manufacturers when describing a drug's uses.'7
To ensure-compliance with these labeling requirements, the
FDA has promulgated various regulations that affect the ability of
pharmaceutical companies to engage in off-label communications.18
FDA regulations do not expressly prohibit off-label communications,
but manufacturers are prohibited from introducing a drug into inter-
state commerce without FDA approved labeling.19 If a drug's labeling
is false or misleading, the manufacturer is guilty of the crime of
"misbranding."20 In certain circumstances, off-label promotion may
even result in civil liability under the False Claims Act ("FCA"). 21 The
14 Allison M. Sgroi, Federal Food and Drug Act Violations, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 609,
610 (2002).
15 50th Anniversary of the Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments of 1962 - Interview
with FDA Historian John Swann, U.S. FDA (last updated Dec. 3, 2015),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/NewsEvents/ucm320927.htm. Similar to the cir-
cumstances surrounding the adoption of the FDCA, the Kefauver-Harris
Amendment was created in response to the unfortunate discovery that Thalid-
omide, a drug commonly prescribed for morning sickness, caused thousands of
birth defects throughout Europe and Africa. Id.; see also 50 Years: The Kefauver-
Harris Amendments, U.S. FDA (last updated Feb. 26, 2016),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/NewsEvents/ucm320924.htm.
16 21 C.F.R. §§ 331(a), 352(a) (2015).
17 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(2) (2015).
1 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201-03 (2015).
19 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2012). -
20 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 333(a) (2012).
21 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2013). For the purposes of this Note, discussion will pre-
dominantly focus on violations of the FDCA, not the FCA. For more information
about the intersection between the FCA and off-label communications, see Joan
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overarching threat of a misbranding action or FCA liability makes it
difficult for pharmaceutical firms to engage in off-label communica-
tions.
In contrast, the FDA recognizes that physicians must be able
to use their "best knowledge and judgment" when treating pa-
tients.22 Therefore, the FDA permits physicians to write prescrip-
tions for off-label uses without penalty under the FDCA.23 This cre-
ates a strange paradox where physicians can prescribe medications
for off-label uses, but pharmaceutical companies-the companies
that make and test these drugs-are not able to provide doctors with
information that may be necessary to make the most informed deci-
sions.
Ill. OFF-LABEL USE AND PROMOTION
A. Off-Label Prescribing by Physicians
To better understand these regulatory inconsistencies, phy-
sicians' and pharmaceutical companies' off-label practices must be
distinguished. The FDCA mandates FDA approval of a drug's use, but
the reality is that more than 20% of prescriptions are written for off-
label uses,24 with this percentage being even higher in specific sub-
H. Krause, Truth, Falsity, and Fraud: Off-Label Drug Settlements and the Future of
the Civil False Claims Act 71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. (forthcoming 2016); Marcia M.
Boumil & Kaitlyn L. Dunn, Off-Label Marketing of Pharmaceutical Products in the
Wake of United States v. Caronia and United States v. Harkonen, 9 J. HEALTH &
BIOMED. L. 385 (2014); Isaac D. Buck, Side Effects: State Anti-Fraud Statutes, Off-
Label Marketing, and the Solvable Challenge of Causation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV.
2129 (2015); Lise-T. Spacapan & Jill M. Hutchinson, Prosecutions of Pharmaceu-
tical Companies for Off-Label Marketing: Fueled By Government's Desire to Modify
Corporate Conduct or Pursuit of a Lucrative Revenue Stream?, 22 ANN. HEALTH L.
407 (2013).
22 "Off-Label" and Investigational Use of Marketed Drugs, Biologics, and Medical
Devices - Information Sheet, U.S. FDA (last updated Jan. 25, 2016),
http://www.fda.gov/Regulatorylnformation/Guidances/ucml26486.htm
[hereinafter "Off-Label" Information Sheet].
2 3 See id.
24 David C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians,
166 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1023 (2006).
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populations.25 Professor Joan Krause notes that this statistic yields
varying interpretations.26 For example, some explain this percentage
as evidence that in certain circumstances off-label use is standard
practice, while others view this as proof that off-label prescribing
practices have reached dangerously high levels.27 No matter the
reader's interpretation of this statistic, in some situations, off-label
use of an approved drug may be a patient's only option.28
The Mayo CliniC 29 outlines several scenarios that require or
encourage doctors to prescribe off-label.30 For example, a physician
may prescribe a drug that is FDA approved for one specific group to
another non-approved group, such as pediatric or geriatric pa-
tients.31 These non-approved groups tend to be subpopulations that
are difficult to conduct FDA testing on, or that have not been studied
adequately, including children, cancer patients, psychiatric patients,
and the elderly.3 2 In fact, one study found that 78.9% of children dis-
charged from pediatric hospitals are prescribed at least one medica-
25 See Jared Iraggi, The Future of Off-Label Marketing Regulations in the Post-
Sorrell Era, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1137, 1137 (2013) (citing Gregory Gentry,
Criminalizing Knowledge: The Perverse Implications of the Intended Use Regula-
tions for Off-Label Promotion Prosecutions, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 441, 442 (2009));
Christopher M. Wittich et al., Ten Common Questions (and Their Answers) About
Off-label Drug Use, MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS 982, 983 (2012),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pimc/articles/PMC3538391/pdf/main.pdf.
26 Krause, supra note 4.
27 Id. (citing Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. FDA, - F. Supp. 3d -, No. 15 Civ.
3588(PAE), 2015 WL 4720039 at 3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2015). But see Marc A.
Rodwin, Rooting Out Institutional Corruption to Manage Off-Label Use, 41 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 654, 655-56 (2013) (describing "frequent lack of scientific sup-
port" and arguing that off-label use "makes clinical sense as an exception rather
than as the rule")).
28 See Understanding Investigational Drugs and Off Label Use ofApproved Drugs,
U.S. FDA (last updated Feb. 5, 2016),
http://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Other/OffLabel/default.htm.
29 The Mayo Clinic is a worldwide nonprofit that conducts medical research and
provides medical education to the public. For more information, see About Mayo
Clinic, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/about-mayo-clinic (last visited
March 12, 2016).
3 0 Wittich et al., supra note 26, at 982.
31 d.
32 Id.
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tion for off-label indications.33 This includes the well-known drug
Morphine, which hospitals commonly prescribe to injured children
without specific FDA approval.34
In situations involving rare diseases and high-risk illnesses,
off-label prescriptions may be a patient's only treatment option.35 In
fact, approximately 56% of cancer patients are given at least one
drug off-label.36 Even in the absence of a rare disease or high-risk ill-
ness, doctors may choose to prescribe a non-FDA approved medica-
tion when a drug is in the same class as another FDA approved drug
for that indication.37 Similarly, when the pathologic or physiologic
features of two medical conditions are alike, a doctor may prescribe
medication (which is approved for only one of the conditions) for the
other condition, or both conditions, without FDA approval.38 As the
FDCA explicitly recognizes,39 some situations require physicians to
use their medical knowledge and judgment to prescribe non-FDA
approved medications for the sake of their patient's health.
B. Off-Label Promotion by Pharmaceutical Companies
While physicians are free to prescribe medications for off-
label uses, FDA regulations prohibit pharmaceutical companies from
33 Id. at 983 (citing Samir S. Shah et al., Off-Label Drug Use in Hospitalized Chil-
dren, 161 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 282-90 (2007)).
34 See Wittich et al., supra note 26, at 984-85 (displaying examples of common
off-label uses of drugs in a table).
3 See id. at 983; see also Iraggi, supra note 26, at 1137.
36 Rodney Smolla, Off-Label Drug Advertising and the First Amendment, 50 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 81, 87 (2015) (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/PEMD-91-
14, OFF-LABEL DRUGS: REIMBURSEMENT POLICIES CONSTRAIN PHYSICIANS IN THEIR
CHOICE OF CANCER THERAPIES 4 (1991)).
3 7 Wittich et al., supra note 26, at 982.
38 Id. For example, anxiety and posttraumatic stress disorder are two, similar
psychiatric diseases. A doctor may choose to prescribe a medication approved
for posttraumatic stress disorder for anxiety, a non-FDA approved use.
3 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2012) ("Nothing in this Act [21 USCS §§ 301 et seq.] shall be
construed to limit or interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to
prescribe or administer any legally marketed device to a patient for any condi-
tion or disease within a legitimate health care practitioner-patient relation-
ship.").
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off-label marketing.40 Ethical concerns arise when pharmaceutical
firms use marketing strategies to influence physicians.41 Such mar-
keting strategies include detailing,42 giving gifts, supplying medica-
tion samples to physicians, and providing grants to health organiza-
tions.43 Although some courts have described doctors as a
"sophisticated audience" capable of determining if such information
is misleading,44 it is questionable how truly "sophisticated" physi-
cians can be when faced with pharmaceutical firms that invest bil-
lions of dollars in such marketing strategies.45
To diminish these ethical concerns, the FDA has extensively
fined pharmaceutical companies for the promotion of off-label uses
40 See Greene & Noah, supra note 3, at 250; see also, 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(i)(a)
(2015) (advertising may not "recommend or suggest any use that is not in the
labeling accepted in such approved new-drug application or supplement").
41 See Persuading the Prescribers: Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing and its In-





42 Detailing is when a pharmaceutical company physically visits a physician to
conduct a face-to-face pitch. Id
43 Id
44 See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166 (2d Cir. 2012) ("'[The] fear
that [physicians, sophisticated and experienced customers,] would make bad
decisions if given truthful information' cannot justify content-based burdens on
speech."') (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011)); Mohr
v. Targeted Genetics, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 711, 721 n.5 (C.D. Ill. 2010) ("[T]he
[c]ourt observes that physicians constitute a fairly sophisticated audience.");
Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 63 (D.D.C. 1998)
("[P]hysicians are a highly educated, professionally-trained and sophisticated
audience."); see also JEROME GROOPMAN, How DOCTORS THINK 221 (2007); Stepha-
nie M. Greene, After Caronia: First Amendment Concerns in Off-Label Promotion,
51 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 645, 701 (2014) (citing David T. Burke et al., Reading Habits
of Practicing Physiatrists, 81 AM J. PHYS. MED. & REHAB. 779, 779 (2002)); Shane
M. Ward, WLF and the Two Click Rule: The First Amendment Inequity of the Food
and Drug Administration's Regulation of Off-Label Drug Use Information on the
Internet, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 41, 47-48 (2001).
45 Persuading the Prescribers, upra note 42 ("In 2012, the pharmaceutical in-
dustry spent more than $27 billion on drug promotion-more than $24 billion
on marketing to physicians and over $3 billion on advertising to consumers.")
(internal citations omitted).
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in violation of the FDCA's misbranding provisions.46 In 2004, for 'ex-
ample, Warner-Lambert entered a plea agreement for violating the
FDCA's misbranding provisions and agreed to pay $240 million in
criminal fines.47 Warner-Lambert allegedly promoted Neurontin, an
FDA-approved seizure preventative, for unapproved uses such as
treating bipolar disorder, attention deficit disorder, and restless leg
syndrome.48 Additionally, in 2009, Pfizer Inc. and two of its subsidi-
ary companies paid $1.3 billion in criminal fines for the alleged off-
label promotion of the anti-inflammatory drug Bextra, which the
FDA specifically declined to approve for the treatment of acute pain
and surgical pain. 49 ,
More recently, in the largest healthcare fraud settlement in
U.S. history, GlaxoSmithKline LLC entered into a criminal plea
agreement and paid over $750 million in criminal fines for allegedly
promoting Paxil and Wellbutrin's off-label uses.50 The pharmaceuti-
cal firm allegedly promoted Paxil for treating depression in children
when the FDA had not approved the drug for pediatric use.5' In addi-
tion, the firm allegedly promoted Wellbutrin for treating substance
addictions, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and for other off-
label uses when the FDA had only approved Wellbutrin for the
46 For the purposes of this Note, discussion is limited to violations under the
FDCA. While off-label promotion can lead to violations under the FCA, discus-
sion pertaining to the FCA is beyond the scope of this Note. For. further discus-
sion about off-label promotions leading to violations of the FCA, see Krause, su-
pra note 22.
47 Warner Lambert to Pay $430 Million To Resolve Criminal & Civil Health Care
Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (May 13, 2004),
.http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2004/May/04_civ_322.htm.
48 Id
49 Justice Department Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its His-
tory, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 2, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-largest-health-
care-fraud-settlement-its-history; see also, Pfizer Settlement Agreement, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE (2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-
ma/legacy/2012/10/09/Pfizer%20Settlement%2OAgreement.pdf.
so GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations






treatment of major depressive disorder.52 Overall, ten of the twenty
largest settlements and judgments between 1991 and 2012 related
to the unlawful promotion of a prescription medication in violation
of the FDCA.s
As staggering as these settlements may seem, pharmaceutical
companies continue to engage in off-label promotion,54 as the profits
generated from promoting off-label uses far exceed the FDA's penal-
ties.55 When pharmaceutical companies promote a drug's off-label
uses, manufacturers can avoid the lengthy5 6 and expensive task of
obtaining FDA approval.57 Off-label communications between physi-
cians and pharmaceutical representatives may even equip pharma-
ceutical firms with valuable information concerning the different us-
es for which physicians are prescribing the firm's drugs. Considering
the informational and economic benefits of engaging in off-label
communications, it is not hard to imagine how many pharmaceutical
companies could view off-label promotion as a smart business move.
C The Free Flow of Medical Information
Ethical concerns arise when pharmaceutical companies en-
gage in marketing practices to promote the sale of a drug, prioritiz-
ing revenue over science. It is important, however, to balance con-
cerns over pharmaceutical greed and abuse with the reality that off-
label prescribing is occurring. To best do so, physicians should have
access -to information concerning the effects of off-label prescrip-
52 Id
s3 Sammy Almashat & Sidney Wolfe, Pharmaceutical Industry Criminal and Civil
Penalties: An Update, PUB. CITIZEN 45 (2012),
http://www.citizen.org/documents/20731.pdf (Table 7).
54 Marc A. Rodwin, Do We Need Stronger Sanctions to Ensure Legal Compliance
By Pharmaceutical Firms?, 70 FOOD DRUG L.J. 435 (2015).
ss Id. at 436.
56 On average, it takes approximately "15 years from the beginning of drug de-
velopment until a drug can be marketed." Marc A. Rodwin, Independent Drug
Testing to Ensure Drug Safety and Efficacy, 18 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 45, 80
(2015) [hereinafter Independent Drug Testing].
s7 See Avik S. A. Roy, Stifling New Cures: The True Cost of Lengthy Clinical Drug
Trials, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POL'Y RES., PROJECT FDA REP. 5 (2012),
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/fda_05.pdf.
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tions. By restricting pharmaceutical companies from engaging in off-
label promotion, "physicians may find it difficult to establish how
others in their fields are using medication outside their FDA ap-
proved uses," and, in turn, may not learn about the positive and neg-
ative effects of prescribing certain medications for their off-label in-
dications.58
In the alternative, are there other less biased avenues
through which physicians can obtain information about a drug's off-
label uses? Professor Marc A. Rodwin argues that independent drug
testing is needed in order to eliminate the dissemination of biased
drug information.59 Since drug firms often bias clinical trials through
design, control, and financial influence,60 it is imperative that physi-
cians have access to clinical trials funded by nonproprietary sources,
such as the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' National
Institutes of Health ("NIH"). 61 A recent study, however, suggests that
while the number of industry-sponsored trials has increased 43%
between 2006 and 2014, the number of NIH-sponsored trials have
decreased by 24%.62 Until the requisite reform occurs,63 physicians
must continue to prescribe drugs using the available sources of in-
formation, keeping the best interests of the patient in mind. The real-
ity is that a vast amount of drug information comes from industry-
sponsored clinical trials.64
s8 Wittich et al., supra note 26, at 987 (citing Katherine A. Helm, Protecting Pub-
lic Health from Outside the Physician's Office: A Century of FDA Regulation from
Drug Safety Labeling to Off-Label Drug Promotion, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA& ENT. L.J. 117 (2007)).
s9 See Independent Drug Testing, supra note 57, at 80.
6 0 Independent Drug Testing, supra note 57, at 46-48.
61 See generally NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/ (last accessed Jan.
18, 2016).
62 Stephanie Desmon, Industry-Financed Clinical Trials on the Rise as Number of
NIH-Funded Trials Falls, HUB (Dec. 15, 2015),
http://hub.jhu.edu/2015/12/15/industry-funded-clinical-trials-may-threaten-
objectivity ("The number of newly registered industry-sponsored trials in-
creased 43 percent over the time period, from 4,585 in 2006 to 6,550 in 2014.
The number of newly registered NIH-funded trials decreased 24 percent over
the same period, from 1,376 in 2006 to 1,048 in 2014.").
63 For a potential method of reform, see Independent Drug Testing, supra note
57, at 82-84.
6 4See id.
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To quote the FDA: "Good medical practice and the best inter-
ests of the patient require that physicians use legally available drugs,
biologics and devices according to their best knowledge and judg-
ment."6 5 It is curious that the FDA expects physicians to make knowl-
edgeable and informed decisions, yet deprives doctors of a large
amount of the medical information necessary to make such deci-
sions. Although the FDA's behavior is not unfounded and physicians
do have access to nonproprietary information sources, there must be
better alternatives for protecting the public that do not involve the
suppression of potentially vital medical information or infringement
upon the First Amendment.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH WITHIN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
Supreme Court precedent makes clear that truthful, non-
misleading commercial speech is protected under the First Amend-
ment.6 6 Part IV provides a historical analysis of the landmark cases
that led to the recent district court decision in Amarin Pharma Inc. v.
United States FDA and furthermore suggests that First Amendment
protection extends to truthful, non-misleading off-label communica-
tions.
A An Introduction to Commercial Speech
In the 1976 Supreme Court case, Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,6 7 the Court
acknowledged that "society ... may have a strong interest in the free
flow of commercial information."68 Furthermore:
65 Coleen Klasmeier & Martin H. Redish, Off-Label Prescription Advertising, the
FDA and the First Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Pro-
tection, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 315, 318 (2011)(quoting "Off-Label" Information Sheet,
supra note 23) (emphasis added).
66 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
67 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
68 Id at 764.
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Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it
sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemina-
tion of information as to who is producing and
selling what product, for what reason, and at
what price. So long as we preserve a predomi-
nantly-free enterprise economy, the allocation of
our resources in large measure will be made
through numerous private economic decisions.
It is a matter of public interest that those deci-
sions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well in-
formed. To this end, the free flow of commercial
information is indispensable.69
Recognizing our democratic interest in preserving the free flow of
information, the Court held that commercial speech is constitutional-
ly protected.70 The Court did, however, note limitations to this find-
ing.71 Specifically, regulation of commercial speech is justified when
(1) the regulation does not concern content; (2) "the regulation
serve[s] a significant government interest"; and (3) there are no al-
ternative channels for communication of the information.72
In the 1980 case, Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission,73 the Court established a four-part analysis for
determining when commercial speech is protected under the First
Amendment.74 First, the commercial speech must be lawful and non-
misleading.75 Second, the government interest must be substantial.76
Third, the regulation must "directly advance[" the specific govern-
ment interest.77 Finally, the regulation cannot be more than neces-
sary to serve the specific interest.78 As the following major off-label
decisions evidence, courts continue to apply the Central Hudson test
69 Id at 765 (emphasis added).
7o Id. at 770.
71 See id at 771.
72 Id
73 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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in determining whether or not the First Amendment protects specif-
ic commercial speech.
B. Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney: The "Safe Harbor" Pro-
visions
In its original action, Washington Legal Foundation sought a
declaratory judgment finding that FDA policies restricting off-label
promotion violated the First Amendment.79 According to Washing-
ton Legal Foundation, these policies were expressed through FDA
guidance documents,80 which attempted to distinguish marketing ac-
tivities that are subject to regulation under the FDCA's advertising
and labeling provisions from activities that serve purely scientific
and educational purposes and are therefore exempt from FDA regu-
lation.81 Before the district court could rule on its final decision, Con-
gress amended the FDCA and enacted the 1997 Food and Drug Ad-
ministration Modernization Act ("FDAMA"),82 thus superseding the
FDA guidance documents. Most notably, FDAMA § 401 gave manu-
facturers limited permission to disseminate off-label information.83
For the reasons discussed below, the court in Washington Legal
79 Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54 (D.D.C. 1998).
80 See Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activi-
ties, 62 Fed. Reg. 64074 (Dec. 3, 1997), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
1997-12-03/pdf/97-31741.pdf; Advertising and Promotion; Guidances, 61 Fed.
Reg. 52800 (Oct. 8, 1996), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1996-10-
08/pdf/96-25728.pdf.
81 See Guidance for Industry, Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Ac-
tivities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64093 (Dec. 3, 1997)
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Regulatorylnformation/Guidances/UCM1256
02.pdf.
82See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-
115, § 401, 111 Stat 2296, 2356 (1997),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-105publ115/pdf/PLAW-
105publ115.pdf. The purpose of FDAMA was to recognize the complexity of
21st century technological and public health advancements. Food and Drug Ad-
ministration Modernization Act (FDAMA) of 1997, U.S. FDA (Nov. 23, 2015),
http://www.fda.gov/Regulatorylnformation/Legislation/SignificantAmendmen
tstotheFDCAct/FDAMA/default.htm.
83 See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 § 551, 111 Stat
at 2356-358.
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Foundation v. Henney84 ultimately held that the FDAMA and its im-
plementing regulations perpetuated the policies held unconstitu-
tional in Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman and unconstitu-
tionally restricted protected commercial speech.85
To find that the FDAMA's commercial speech regulations vio-
lated the First Amendment, the court in Washington Legal Founda-
tion v. Henney applied the four-prong Central Hudson test.8 6 First, the
court noted that the speech at issue was neither false nor mislead-
ing.87 Defendants attempted to argue that the pharmaceutical mar-
keter's speech was likely misleading because "manufacturers have
an incentive to disseminate information that presents their drugs on-
ly in a positive light, omitting negative information."8 8 Nonetheless,
the court rejected the defendant's arguments for two reasons: (1)
the FDA cannot "restrict speech based on its perception that the
speech could, may, or might mislead," and (2) the defendants in this
case did not express concern over physicians exchanging off-label in-
formation, therefore, discriminating among specific speakers.89
Second, the court in Washington Legal Foundation recognized
that only one of the policies in the FDAMA directly advanced a sub-
stantial government interest.90 The court discussed two government
interests at issue in this case, including the concern that doctors re-
ceive "accurate and unbiased" information and that manufacturers
are encouraged to seek FDA approval.9 ' The court quickly rejected
the first government interest and stated that it is a violation of the
84 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 83-87 (D.D.C. 1999), vacated in part, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir.
2000); see also Greene & Noah, supra note 3, at 242.
as Wash. Legal Found., 56 F. Supp. 2d at 84-87.
86 Id. at 85 ("The First Amendment is premised upon the idea that people do not




89 Id. at 85-86 (quoting Greater New Orleans Broad. Assoc. v. United States, 527
U.S. 193, 194 (1999) ("Even under the degree of scrutiny that we have applied
in commercial speech cases, decisions that select among speakers conveying
virtually identical messages are in serious tension with the principles under-
girding the First Amendment")).
90 d. at 86-87.
91 Id at 86.
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14440
STRIKING A BALANCE
First Amendment to prevent a listener, especially a "sophisticated
listener [such as a doctor] trained extensively in the use of such in-
formation," from obtaining truthful non-misleading speech for the
fear of the listener misusing information.92 Although the court
acknowledged a substantial government interest in encouraging
manufacturers to seek FDA approval, it noted that only one of the
many policies within the FDAMA directly advanced that interest.93
Further, that policy was deemed unconstitutional because it substan-
tially burdened speech more than necessary to advance the govern-
ment's interests.94
Washington Legal Foundation set the foundation for the D.C.
Circuit to explicitly recognize the First Amendment protection of
truthful, non-misleading speech within the pharmaceutical industry.
The case, however, was later dismissed at the parties' request when
the FDA and Washington Legal Foundation came to an agreement.95
In this agreement, the FDA stated that § 401 of the FDAMA and its
corresponding regulations were "safe harbors," wherein "the distri-
bution of certain materials would not be used as evidence of the
manufacturer's intent that the product be used in an unapproved
manner" so long as the manufacturer met the requirements estab-
lished in § 401 of the FDAMA.96 The FDA's articulation of these safe
harbor provisions suggested that the First Amendment concerns
92 Id. ("The government, however benign its motivations, simply cannot justify a
restriction of truthful nonmisleading speech on the paternalistic assumption
that such restriction is necessary to protect the listener from ignorantly or in-
advertently misusing the information.").
93 Id. at 86-87.
94 Id. at 87 ("The existing factors encouraging supplemental applications, along
with the many non-speech-restrictive alternatives available to the government,
highlight the degree to which the FDAMA unduly burdens commercial speech.
The supplemental application requirement burdens substantially more speech
than necessary to advance the government's legitimate interest, and it therefore
violates the First Amendment.").
95 See Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
96 Gary C. Messplay & Colleen Heisey, Draft Guidance on Good Reprint Practices,





were coming to an end. Unfortunately, Congress allowed the FDAMA
provisions to expire in September 2006.97 The FDA, in turn, issued
new guidance documents98 that have done little to clarify First
Amendment concerns. Part V of this Note will return to the discus-
sion of safe harbor provisions as an alternative measure for regulat-
ing off-label communications.
C. Thompson v. Western States Medical Center: Drug Advertising
and the First Amendment
In the 2002 Supreme Court decision, Thompson v. Western
States Medical Center, the Court held that the 1997 FDAMA ban on
advertising compounded drugs (drugs mixed together to meet the
needs of an individual patient) violated the First Amendment.99 In
applying the Central Hudson test, the Court found that the govern-
ment failed the fourth prong of the test when it failed to show that
the regulations were not more extensive than necessary to serve the
government's specific interest.00 Echoing the sentiments of Wash-
ington Legal Foundation, the Court stated, "If the Government could
achieve its interests in a manner that does not restrict speech, or
that restricts less speech, the Government must do so."1or
Through dicta, the Court explained its stance on controlling
commercial speech that may affect a physician's decisions:
9 See Robert 1. Field, The FDA's New Guidance for Off-Label Promotion Is Only a
Start, 33 HEALTH CARE & L. 4 (April 2008),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2730097/pdf/ptj33_4p220.pd
f.
98 See Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical journal Articles and
Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses ofApproved
Drugs and Approved or Cleared Medical Devices, U.S. FDA (Jan. 2009),
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucml25126.htm
[hereinafter Good Reprint Practices]; Guidance for Industry Distributing Scientific
and Medical Publications on Risk Information for Approved Prescription Drugs
and Biological Products-Recommended Practices, U.S. FDA (June 2014),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinforma
tion/guidances/ucm400104.pdf.
9 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
100 Id. at 371.
101 Id.
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Even if the Government had argued that the FDAMA's
speech-related restrictions were motivated by a fear
that advertising compounded drugs would put peo-
ple who do not need such drugs at risk by causing
them to convince their doctors to prescribe the drugs
anyway, that fear would fail tojustify the restrictions.
. . this concern amounts to a fear that people would
make bad decisions if given truthful information
about compounded drugs .... We have previously re-
jected the notion that the Government has an interest
in preventing the dissemination of truthful commercial
information in order to prevent members of the public
from making bad decisions with the information.102
Once again, the Court reiterated that the government's interest in
preventing physicians from misusing truthful information does not
justify infringing on First Amendment rights.103 It is clear that courts
have taken a position where the concerns for First Amendment pro-
tection outweigh the fear or speculation that a healthcare provider
may misuse drug information.
D. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.: A New Two-Part Analysis
In the 2011 Supreme Court case Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,104
the Court created a two-step analysis, combining heightened judicial
scrutiny with the Central Hudson test, to find that a Vermont statute
prohibiting pharmaceutical companies from using prescriber-
identifying information for marketing purposes violated the First
Amendment.105 The Court applied heightened scrutiny because the
speech involved "viewpoint discrimination."0 6 More specifically, the
Vermont law placed content- and speaker-based restrictions on
speech because the law targeted pharmaceutical manufacturers (a
speaker-based restriction) and strictly forbade manufacturers from
10 2 Id. at 374 (emphasis added).
103 Id.
104 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011).
105 Id. at 2659.
106 Id. at 2657.
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buying doctors' prescribing history for marketing purposes (a con-
tent-based restriction).10 7
The Sorrell Court noted that under a commercial speech in-
quiry, the state has to show that "the statute directly advances a sub-
stantial government interest and that the measure is drawn to
achieve that interest . . . [therefore] ensur[ing] not only that the
State's interests are proportional to the resulting burdens placed on
speech but also that the law does not seek to suppress a disfavored
message."08 In this case, the Court held that the state's justifica-
tions-medical privacy and the improvement of public health-did
not withstand scrutiny.09 The Court explained that "concern for 'a
few' physicians who may have 'felt coerced and harassed' by phar-
maceutical marketers" does not justify violating the First Amend-
ment and infringing upon constitutional freedoms.110
Ultimately, the Sorrell Court applied a hybrid analysis of both
heightened scrutiny and the Central Hudson test,"' holding that the
State engaged in content-based discrimination for the sole purpose
of "burden[ing] the [disfavored] speech of detailers."112 The Court
recognized that the outcome of the case would have been the same
regardless of whether it applied heightened judicial scrutiny or the
lesser standard set out in Central Hudson.113 This decision expanded
the First Amendment protection of commercial speech and made
clear that protection of the Constitution, specifically the First
Amendment, substantially outweighs concerns of healthcare provid-
ers potentially misusing information due to ignorance or possible
undue influence from pharmaceutical manufacturers seeking
sales.114
E. United States v. Caronia: The Sorrell Analysis in Action
107Id. at 2663.
10 Id. at 2667-68 (citing Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662-63
(1994)).
109 Id. at 2668.
110 Id. at 2670.
111 Id. at 2659, 2667-68.
112Id. at 2672.
113 Id. at 2667.
11 4 Id. at 2671.
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Under the principle of constitutional avoidance, the 2012 Se-
cond Circuit case, United States v. Caronia,115 held that the FDCA does
not prohibit or criminalize off-label promotional speech, standing
alone.116 After an investigation of the off-label promotion of Xyrem-
a drug containing gamma-hydroxybutryate ("GHB") or what is better
known as the "date rape drug," and FDA approved for treating narco-
leptic patients experiencing cataplexy and for treating narcoleptic
patients with excessive daytime sleepiness-the federal government
charged a pharmaceutical sales representative from Orphan Medical,
Inc. with conspiracy to introduce a misbranded drug into interstate
commerce.117 The government's allegations were based on recorded
evidence, which showed Caronia promoting Xyrem for off-label indi-
cations, including treatment of fibromyalgia and chronic pain, as well
as treatment in "patients as young as fourteen . . . and greater than
sixty-five"-even when the drug contained the FDA's highest "black
box" warning concerning the safety and efficacy of prescribing
Xyrem to children and the elderly.118 Notably, the court did not find
that the case involved false or misleading promotion, nor did the
government allege that the promotional speech involved was false or
misleading.119 Caronia, on the other hand, argued that the govern-
11s 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
116 Id., 703 F.3d at 160 ("While the FDCA makes it a crime to misbrand or con-
spire to misbrand a drug, the statute and its accompanying regulations do not
expressly prohibit or criminalize off-label promotion. Rather, the FDCA and FDA
regulations reference "promotion" only as evidence of a drug's intended use.
Thus, under the principle of constitutional avoidance . . . we construe the FDCA
as not criminalizing the simple promotion of a drug's off-label use because such
a construction would raise First Amendment concerns.") (internal citations
omitted).
117 Id. at 155-160; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a) and 333(a)(2) (2012).
118 See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 155-57. Xyrem requires a "black box" warning, the
strongest FDA warning. For more information, see FDA Drug Safety Communica-
tion: Warning Against Use of Xyrem (Sodium Oxybate) with Alcohol or Drugs
Causing Respiratory Depression, U.S. FDA (Dec. 17, 2012),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/ucm332029.htm; Xyrem (Sodium Ox-
ybate) Oral Solution CIII Labeling, U.S. FDA,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda-docs/label/2012/021196s0131bl.p
df (last visited March 12, 2016).
119 See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 165-67.
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ment convicted him based on his speech, specifically for promoting
the off-label use of an FDA approved drug, and therefore the gov-
ernment infringed upon Caronia's First Amendment right to free
speech.120.
The court in Caronia applied Sorrell's two-step analysis to de-
termine whether the government's interpretation of the FDCA's mis-
branding provisions violated the First Amendment.121 First, the court
found that the speech at issue imposed content- and speaker-based
restrictions on speech, thus requiring heightened scrutiny.122 Se-
cond, the court noted that even under Central Hudson's intermediate
scrutiny standard, the government's regulations did not directly ad-
vance the government's goals of safety and efficacy, nor was it neces-
sary to construe the FDCA as criminalizing off-label drug promotion
in order to achieve the government's substantial interests.12 3 Ulti-
mately, it is the role of the speaker and the audience-not the gov-
ernment-to determine whether or not to use off-label infor-
mation.124
In dicta, the court in Caronia suggested alternative methods
for advancing the government's interests in protecting the public
and encouraging FDA approval.125 The court's suggestions are help-
ful in thinking about potential ways to balance protecting the First
Amendment and the government's public health concerns. First, the
court suggested that the government could create guidelines to as-
sist physicians in differentiating between truthful and misleading in-
120 Id. at 152.
121 Id. at 164.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 167 ("[I]t is the physician's role to consider multiple factors, including a
drug's FDA-approval status, to determine the best course of action for her pa-
tient...'[T]he choice ... is not ours to make or the [egislature's].'... Moreover,
in the fields of medicine and public health, 'where information can save lives,' it
only furthers the public interest to ensure that decisions about the use of pre-
scription drugs, including off-label usage, are intelligent and well-informed.")
(internal citations omitted).
125 Id. at 168.
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formation.126 Second, the court noted that the government could re-
quire disclaimers warning physicians that the use is not FDA ap-
proved.127 Third, the government could require pharnfiaceutical
companies to list all intended uses when the company first applies
for FDA approval.128 Finally, the government could put a cap on the
number of off-label prescriptions or, in specific circumstances, ban
off-label use altogether.129 While the latter options are not without
shortcomings, the court's discussion is illustrative of the many avail-
able alternatives for regulating pharmaceutical companies that do
not impede on the Constitution. Some of these alternatives will be
discussed again in further detail in Part V of this Note.
F. Amarin Pharma Inc. v. United States FDA: A New Set of Facts, the
Same Finding
The 2015 case, Amarin Pharma Inc. v. United States FDA, is
the most recent landmark decision discussing the intersection be-
tween the First Amendment and off-label communications.130 Ama-
rin Pharma Inc. ("Amarin") -sought preliminary injunctive relief
against the FDA for threatening to pursue a misbranding action if
Amarin continued to engage in the truthful, non-misleading promo-
tion of the off-label uses for the FDA approved drug, Vascepa.'3' Ac-
cording to Amarin, the FDA's threats of a misbranding action were
"chilling [Amarin] from engaging in constitutionally protected truth-
ful speech."132 Guided by the decision in Caronia, the district court
granted Amarin relief and held that criminalizing truthful and non-
misleading speech that promotes an off-label use violates the First
Amendment and "may not form the basis of a prosecution for mis-
126 Id. (citing John E. Osborn, Can I Tell You the Truth? A Comparative Perspective
on Regulating Off-Label Scientific and Medical Information, 10 YALE J. HEALTH
POL'Y L. & ETHIcs 299, 305-07 (2013)).
127 Id. (citing Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 66, at 334).
128 Id
129 Id. (citing United States v. Bader, 678 F.3d 858, 873 (10th Cir. 2012)).
130 Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. United States'FDA, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103944
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2015) (No. 15 Civ. 3588).
131 Id.
132 Id. at *3.
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branding."133 While some commentators viewed the holding in Caro-
nia as limited to the specific facts of the case,134 the district court
adopted the Second Circuit's holding that the First Amendment pro-
tects truthful commercial speech-even when the facts of Amarin
were vastly different from those presented in Caronia.
The dispute in Amarin is unique from the facts of Caronia in
that Amarin followed the FDA's requirements for approval of the
drug Vascepa, but the FDA reneged on its promise.135 To obtain FDA
approval for the use of Vascepa in patients with high triglyceride
levels, Amarin followed the FDA's requirements in the "special pro-
tocol assessment" ("SPA")136 and conducted two requisite clinical
trials, namely the "ANCHOR study" and the "REDUCE-IT study."37 In
2012, the FDA approved Vascepa for treating adult patients with tri-
glyceride levels above 500 mg/dL of blood.138 The FDA did not, how-
ever, approve Vascepa for use in statin-treated patients with persis-
tently high triglyceride levels between 200 and 499 mg/dL of
blood.139 .
Although the ANCHOR study showed that Vascepa signifi-
cantly reduced triglyceride levels in patients with persistently high
triglycerides, meeting the FDA requirements. outlined in the
ANCHOR SPA agreement, an FDA Advisory Committee relied on un-
133 Id. at *110.
134 See, e.g., Tamara Fraizer, U.S. v. Caronia: What are the Implications?, PHARM.
COMPLIANCE MONITOR (March 15, 2013),
http://www.pharmacompliancemonitor.com/u-s-v-caronia-what-are-the-
implications/4229/.
135Amarin, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103944, at *34.
136 Id. at *34. A special protocol assessment is a written agreement between a
manufacturer and the FDA that outlines the specific requirements for drug clin-
ical trials, and the conditions under which the FDA will approve said drug. For
more information, see Guidance for Industry: Special Protocol Assessment, U.S.
FDA 2 (2002),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/.../Guidances/ucm080571.pdf. "The
FDA can rescind an SPA agreement only if 'a substantial scientific issue essential
to determining the safety or effectiveness of the drug has been identified after
the testing has begun."' Id.
137 Amarin, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103944, at *30-34.
138 Id. at *31-33 (noting that high triglyceride levels result in an increased risk
of pancreatitis and cardiovascular disease in adult patients).
139 Id. at *33.
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related clinical trials to find that there was "substantial uncertainty"
as to whether a reduction in triglyceride levels would in fact improve
cardiovascular health in patients.140 Even though the Advisory Com-
mittee did not dispute that Vascepa was safe for use in adult patients
with high triglyceride levels,141 the FDA threatened a misbranding
action if Amarin marketed Vascepa off-label for that use.142 Accord-
ing to Amarin's Complaint, the FDA's threats inhibited Amarin from
promoting the truthful results of the ANCHOR study, which the FDA
told the company to conduct,143 thus prohibiting educated healthcare
professionals from receiving potentially useful healthcare infor-
mation.
Amarin advanced two arguments: (1) under Caronia, the FDA
was not able to bring a misbranding action based on truthful, non-
misleading statements and (2) unlike Caronia's statements, Amarin's
proposed statements, specifically those made about the ANCHOR
study, were truthful and non-misleading.144 After reviewing both the
record of Caronia's triall 45 and the Caronia court's First Amendment
analysis,146 the Amarin court stated, "Where the speech at issue con-
sists of truthful and non-misleading speech promoting the off-label
140 Id. at *37-39. Furthermore, the FDA Complete Response Letter stated that
"[Amarin] will need to provide evidence that Vascepa reduces the risk of major
adverse [cardiovascular] events in patients at high risk for cardiovascular dis-
ease .... We anticipate that the final results from the REDUCE-IT trial [in 2018]
could be submitted to satisfy this deficiency." Id. at *40 (citing London Decl., Ex.
M.). In other words, even though it is undisputed that Vascepa is safe in patients
with high triglyceride levels, the FDA required that Amarin wait three years un-
til 2018 to promote the possible additional benefits of Vascepa to well-educated
physicians and healthcare professionals.
141 Id. at *33.
142 Id. at *39-42.
143 Id
144 Id. at *70.
145 Id. at *74-75 ("To be sure, the Circuit closely reviewed the record of Caroni-
a's trial-in particular, the jury instructions and the government's closing ar-
gument. But the Circuit did so to isolate the acts upon which Caronia's convic-
tion had rested-specifically to determine whether Caronia's speech had
'served merely as "evidence of intent!" or whether Caronia had been 'prosecut-
ed for his speech."').
14 6 Id. at *76-80.
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use of an FDA approved drug, such speech, under Caronia, cannot be
the act upon which an action for misbranding is based."147
The FDA argued that the Caronia ruling ran counter to con-
gressional intent, specifically to the 1962 amendments of the
FDCA.148 The FDA's argument is especially curious when the FDA de-
clined to seek review of Caronia.149 Further, the Amarin court noted
that the FDA is bound by contemporary. First Amendment law, and
that "[t]he Supreme Court held- in Central Hudson (1980) that the
First Amendment gives qualified protection to commercial speech
and in Sorrell (2011) that pharmaceutical marketing qualifies as
such speech."150 Lastly, the decision in Caronia did not interfere with
the FDA's ability to pursue a misbranding action for a manufacturer's
false or misleading speech or its non-verbal off-label promotional ac-
tivities.15
The court next directed its attention to Amarin's second ar-
gument that the speech at issue was truthful and non-misleading.15 2
Specifically, Amarin sought to disseminate 13 peer-reviewed scien-
tific publications relating to coronary heart disease, a summary of
the ANCHOR study, three textual statements, and five disclosures.153
After modifying the disclosure statements, including the addition of
an explanation for the FDA's decision, the court found that Amarin's
speech was truthful and non-misleading.5 4 Even though the FDA ex-
pressed concern that the statements relating to Vascepa's effective-
ness in treating coronary heart disease could one day be misleading,
the court reminded the FDA that:
"[A] governmental body seeking to sustain a re-
striction on commercial speech must demon-
1
4 7 Id. at *80.
148 Id.
149 See Thomas M. Burton, FDA Won't Appeal Free-Speech Marketing Decision,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324539304578260323 5 7 5
925896.
15oAmarin, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103944 at *80.
151 Id. at *85-86.
152 Id. at *87.
153 Id. at *87-88.
1
5 4 Id. at *93-107.
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strate that the harms it recites are real and that
its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a ma-
terial degree"; "[t]his burden is not satisfied by
mere speculation or conjecture". . . . The FDA
cannot use the "rote invocation of the words
'potentially misleading' to discharge its bur-
den."155
The court's position in Amarin is nothing novel, but rather a rever-
beration of the Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions dis-
cussed above.156
V. MOVING FORWARD FROM AMARIN AND CARONIA
Despite First Amendment precedent, it is important to ques-
tion whether a constitutional finding is an appropriate vehicle for
addressing the regulatory actions discussed in this Note. Under the
theory of constitutional avoidance articulated in Ashwander v.
TVA,1s? if the Suprenie Court hears a case that "can be decided on ei-
ther of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the oth-
er a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will
decide only the latter."58 Justice Brandeis's concurring opinion in
Ashwander suggests that a non-constitutional analysis may be a
more apt tool for addressing cases involving the promotion of off-
label uses.159
155 Id. at *107 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
156See supra notes 67-116 and accompanying text
157 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
158 Id. at 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). For a more detailed analysis
of the constitutional avoidance doctrine, see Andrew Nolan, The Doctrine of
Constitutional Avoidance: A Legal Overview; CONGR. RES. SERV. (2014),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43706.pdf.
159 See Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 347 ("The Court will not 'formulate a rule of con-
stitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied.' . . . The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground
upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied appli-
cation. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a
constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or gen-
eral law, the Court will decide only the latter.") (internal citations omitted).
452 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW rVol. 14
One alternative to conducting a constitutional analysis may
be to address these problems through an administrative law lens. As
discussed in Part IV of this Note, since the expiration of the FDAMA
provisions in 2006, the FDA has depended on guidance documents in
order to control the dissemination of information concerning off-
label uses. These procedural shortcuts have allowed the FDA to
shape policy without notice-and-comment 'rulemaking.160 Although
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") does not prohibit the issu-
ance of guidance documents, the FDA's dependence upon them, ra-
ther than notice-and-comment rulemaking, has only further compli-
cated the issues surrounding off-label communications.161
In addition to the constitutional avoidance doctrine, practical
implications suggest that a First Amendment ruling would only ex-
acerbate the tumultuous relationship between the FDA and the
pharmaceutical industry. After thedecisions in Caronia and Amarin,
both the FDA and the pharmaceutical industry have created some-
what of a no-win situation. On one side, the FDA could continue as it
is doing and further restrict the pharmaceutical industry's truthful,
non-misleading off-label promotion. As the Amarin decision exhibits,
however, pharmaceutical firms are ready to fight back. In light of
First Amendment precedent, if given the opportunity, it is not unlike-
ly that the Supreme Court would rule in favor of the pharmaceutical
industry. The FDA's decision not to appeal in Caronia suggests that
this is a path that the FDA is not willing to take.1
62
Alternatively, a First Amendment ruling in favor of the
pharmaceutical industry may actually backfire, causing the FDA to
control off-label promotion through more restrictive measures.163
160 See Lars Noah, Guidance Gone Wild?: FDA's Regrettable Retreat from Legisla-
tive Rulemaking, 30 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER 22, 3 (Oct. 9, 2015),
http://www.wlf.org/upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/100915LB-Noah.
pdf.
161 Id. at 1, 3.
162 See Thomas M. Burton, FDA Won't Appeal Free-Speech Marketing Decision,
WALL ST. J. (an. 23, 2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324539304578260323575
925896.
163 See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 168 (discussing how the FDA could ban off-label use
altogether).
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For example, the FDA could make the FDA-approval process even
more burdensome by withholding drug approval for longer amounts
of time in order to preemptively test for possible off-label uses.1 6 4 Or,
as suggested through dicta in Caronia, the FDA could ban off-label
use altogether.165 No matter the outcome, if the FDA and the phar-
maceutical industry do not strike some sort of balance, it is difficult
to imagine a scenario where either party wins.
Although it may be inappropriate for the Supreme Court to
follow the Second Circuit's expansion of protected commercial
speech, the Caronia and Amarin decisions serve as a warning to the
FDA to adopt alternative measures for regulating the health and
safety of patients, without infringing upon First Amendment protec-
tions. While not exhaustive, the remainder of this Note will focus on
a few of the many viable alternatives for regulating pharmaceutical
marketing practices.
A. Defining "False or Misleading"
The inclusion of truthful, non-misleading off-label promotion
is a win for First Amendment protection, but as a result of the Se-
cond Circuit decision in Caronia as well as the district court decision
in Amarin, the protection of the public health is now an even greater
priority. One of the most glaring consequences of these decisions is
that prosecution now hinges on whether the off-label communica-
tions constitute "false or misleading" information under the FDCA.166
Markedly, the FDA serves as an arbiter who determines whether a
drug's use is approved and whether labeling is considered false or
164 See id. (suggesting that the FDA could require pharmaceutical companies to
provide all intended off-label uses in their application for FDA approval).
s6 5 Id.
166 Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. United States, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103944, at *85
("[T]he First Amendment does not protect false or misleading commercial
speech. Caronia's construction of the misbranding provisions so to exclude
truthful promotion speech affords no protection to a manufacturer that uses
false or misleading communications to promote an off-label use.") Although off-
label promotion can lead to liability under the False Claims Act ("FCA"), the FCA
is beyond the scope of this Note. For a definition of "falsity" under the False
Claims Act, see Krause, supra note 22.
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misleading. It is therefore imperative that the FDA set a clear thresh-,
old for what constitutes false or misleading, in order for courts to de-
termine which cases should move forward with prosecution.
Caronia and Amarin serve as models for what should, and
should not, constitute false or misleading information. Notwith-
standing the government's failure to recognize Caronia's false and
misleading statements,167 the facts in Caronia serve as an example of
clearly punishable behavior that should meet the threshold require-
ment. On the other hand, the pharmaceutical firm in Amarin followed
the FDA's requirements and conducted the requisite clinical trials.168
Amarin serves as an example of a case where the presented facts
should not have met the threshold for what constitutes false or mis-
leading communications. If the FDA continues as it did in Amarin,
and refuses to be flexible, courts will be forced to articulate a thresh-
old standard. Unless the FDA wants courts to define this standard, it
is in the FDA's best interest to institute regulations that clearly de-
fine false or misleading information.
B. Disclosure Statements
Physicians, while masters in the field of medicine, are human
and therefore susceptible to the influence of pharmaceutical compa-
nies. To alert -physicians to the potential safety concerns associated
with prescribing off-label uses, the FDA should produce guidelines
instructing pharmaceutical companies how to create truthful and
non-misleading disclosures that provide physicians with the most
accurate and truthful information possible. These guidelines, howev-
er, should only supplement regulations implemented through notice-
and-comment rulemaking, and should not be a replacement for cre-
ating clear regulations.
167 See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 165-67 (2d Cir. 2012); United
States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 389-90 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (discussing alle-
gations that Caronia promoted Xyrem to a physician for multiple off-label indi-
cations, including treatment in children under the age of sixteen and the elderly,
despite a "black box" warning about the safety and efficacy concerns associated
with prescribing Xyrem to those specific age groups).
68Amarin, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103944, at *30-34.
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The lengthy discussion in Amarin illustrates one method for
creating disclosures that provide physicians with truthful and non-
misleading information.169 Specifically, the court focused on the dis-
pute surrounding Disclosure # 2:
Amarin Disclosure #2: "FDA has not approved Vasce-
pa for the treatment of statin-treated patients with
mixed dyslipidemia and high (? 200 mg/dL and <
500 mg/dL) triglyceride levels."70
According to the FDA, Disclosure #2 failed to explain to physicians
why the FDA had not approved Vascepa for the specific use Amarin
sought to promote.171 After the FDA proposed adding an additional
sentence explaining why the FDA did not approve Vascepa for the
off-label use, Amarin countered that if the FDA is to require a state-
ment about why a drug is not FDA approved, the disclosure must al-
so explain that the off-label use was not necessarily disproven.172
The court in Amarin took both parties' concerns into consid-
eration and ultimately stated that it was necessary to make clear that
Vascepa was not yet proven effective, nor ineffective, at reducing
cardiovascular events.173 The court suggested the following modifi-
cations:
Vascepa is not FDA approved for the treatment
of statin-treated patients with mixed
169 Id. at *48-49 (Amarin Disclosure #1: "FDA has not approved Vascepa to re-
duce the risk of coronary heart disease"; Amarin Disclosure #2: "FDA has not
approved Vascepa for the treatment of statin-treated patients with mixed
dyslipidemia and high ( 200 mg/dL and < 500 mg/dL) triglyceride lev-
els"; Amarin Disclosure #3: "The effect of Vascepa on the risk of cardiovascular
mortality and morbidity has not been determined"; Amarin Disclosure #4: "A
cardiovascular outcomes study of Vascepa designed to evaluate the efficacy of
Vascepa in reducing cardiovascular mortality and morbidity in a high risk pa-
tient population on statin therapy is currently underway."; and Ama-
rin Disclosure #5: "Vascepa may not be eligible for reimbursement under gov-
ernment healthcare programs, such as Medicare or Medicaid, to reduce the risk
of coronary heart disease or for treatment of statin-treated patients with mixed
dyslipidemia and high (2 200 mg/dL and < 500 mg/dL) triglyceride levels. We
encourage you to check that for yourself.").
170 Id. at *93.
17 1 Id.
172 Id. at *94-96.
173 Id.
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dyslipidemia and high (? 200 mg/dL and < 500
mg/dL) triglyceride levels due to current uncer-
tainty regarding the benefit, if any, of drug-
induced changes in lipid/lipoprotein parame-
ters beyond statin-lowered low-density lipopro-
tein cholesterol on cardiovascular risk among
statin-treated patients with residually high tri-
glycerides. No prospective study has been con-
ducted to test and support what, if any, benefit
exists.174
The alterations made to Disclosure #2 provide guidance to courts
trying to discern what constitutes false and misleading disclosures.
This-interaction between the FDA and Amarin is a model for
future pharmaceutical companies seeking to create truthful and non-
misleading disclosures. In summary, when creating disclosure
statements for off-label uses, pharmaceutical companies should fol-
low the requirements set forth in Amarin and explain (1) why the
FDA did not approve the drug for a specific use, and (2) what studies,
if any, have been conducted to test and support what, if any, existing
benefits. Providing this guidance would be a positive first step in ar-
ticulating clear standards to ensure that pharmaceutical firms are
not providing false and misleading information to physicians.
C Monitoring Off-Label Prescribing Practices
As the healthcare industry transitions to electronic medical
records, it is imperative that the FDA embrace technological advanc-
es as a means to monitor pharmaceutical firms' off-label communica-
tions. Professors Ryan Abbott and Ian Ayres have outlined five
methods for increasing the amount of information concerning off-
label uses promoted by both physicians and pharmaceutical firms.175
First, the FDA could require manufacturers to report off-label
uses to the FDA on an annual basis.176 This requirement would not
174 Id. at *97-98 (emphasis added).
175 Ryan Abbott & Ian Ayres, Evidence and Extrapolation: Mechanisms for Regu-
lating Off-babel Uses of Drugs and Devices, 64 DUKE L.J. 377, 399 (2014).
176 Id. at 399.
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be overly burdensome given that most manufacturers already ac-
quire this data for marketing purposes such as detailing.177 This
method would allow the FDA to identify the off-label uses of FDA ap-
proved drugs, while also promoting transparency within the phar-
maceutical industry.178
Second, since physicians ultimately bear the burden of decid-
ing whether or not to prescribe off-label, the FDA must monitor phy-
sician prescribing practices. Because many doctors already report
adverse events to the FDA, Abbott and Ayres's second recommenda-
tion is to give physicians the option to include diagnostic codes in
reports to the FDA Adverse Event Reporting System ("FAERS").17 9
The data obtained from these reports could then be used to group or
identify adverse effects of drugs used for off-label indications.180
Third, Abbott and Ayres contend that the Center for Medi-
care and Medicaid Services (CMS) could make all Medicare/Medicaid
reimbursement requests contingent upon the inclusion of diagnostic
codes.181 Because CMS covers over 100 million people, requiring di-
agnostic codes in all requests would provide the FDA with a wealth
of data concerning off-label prescriptions.182 Professor Jennifer
Herbst aptly cautions, however, that diagnostic coding requirements
should be implemented incrementally and that "prescribers and
pharmacists ... need to [first] understand diagnostic coding as a part
of effective, coordinated patient care as opposed to a mere adminis-
trative requirement for payment."83
177 Id at 400.
178 Id at 400-02.
179 Id. at 403-05; see also Questions and Answers on FDA's Adverse Event Report-
ing System (FAERS), U.S. FDA (last updated Feb. 19, 2016),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Surve
illance/AdverseDrugEffects/.
180 Abbott & Ayres, supra note 176, at 403-04.
181 Id. at 405-07; see also Jennifer L. Herbst, How Medicare Part D, Medicaid,
Electronic Prescribing, and ICD1 0 Could Improve Public Health (But Only If CMS
Lets Them), 24 HEALTH MATRIX 209, 217 (2014) ("[T]here is no single database
within the federal health care system in which a patient's outpatient prescrip-
tion drug use can be cross-referenced with his medical diagnoses.").
182 Abbott & Ayres, supra note 176, at 406.; see also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVs., http://www.cms.gov (last visited Jan. 17, 2016).
183 Herbst, supra note 182, at 213.
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Fourth, Abbott and Ayres argue that the FDA should have the
ability to impose stricter requirements on certain drugs that have
had a higher number of adverse events.184 Stricter requirements for
"FDA-designated" drugs could include requiring a diagnostic code at
the prescription stage.185 Abbott and Ayres state that stricter re-
quirements for "FDA-designated" drugs would allow the FDA to "pick
and choose" their battles.186 If this strategy were implemented, there
would need to be a clear standard for what constitutes a high num-
ber of adverse events, so as to ensure that the FDA does not use this
as a loophole for targeting specific pharmaceutical firms or drugs,
without scientific evidence for doing so.
Finally, the FDA should publish the de-identified data to the
public in order to encourage "crowd sourcing" of important medical
data.187 Abbott and Ayres point out that this data would be beneficial
to an array of stakeholders, including government agencies and non-
profit organizations studying off-label use, insurers making coverage
determinations, academics conducting research, and pharmaceutical
firms developing new drugs.188 Further, the availability of this valua-
ble medical data would ultimately help the greatest stakeholder of
all, patients.
D. Greater Sanctions
Stronger sanctions are needed to make the economic loss
from unlawful promotion outweigh the economic gains of off-label
promotion.189 The Public Citizen Health Research Group tracked
pharmaceutical firm settlements between 1991 and 2012, and found
that most penalties paid were for off-label promotion totaling
184 Abbott & Ayres, supra note 176, at 407-08.
185 Id. at 408.
186 Id.
187 d at 409.
'88 Id.
189 Marc A. Rodwin, Managing Off-Label Drug Use, BILL OF HEALTH (Feb. 10,
2015), http://blogs.1aw.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2015/02/10/managing-off-
label-drug-use/#more-14470.
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$10,536 million.1 90 Additionally, only six pharmaceutical companies
were responsible for 60.5% of the total penalties.191 Clearly, the pen-
alties imposed on these large pharmaceutical companies are not
enough to deter them from. engaging in off-label promotion.192
Given the recidivism of pharmaceutical firms,193 it might not
be the amount of the financial penalties that matters, but rather the
persons to whom these penalties are inflicted. An alternative option
may be to penalize individuals, rather than corporations. As noted in
a recent Department of Justice memorandum, prosecuting individu-
als "deters future illegal activity, [ incentivizes changes in corporate
behavior, [] ensures that the proper parties are held responsible for
their actions, and [] promotes the public's confidence in our justice
system."194
E. The Return of the Safe Harbor Provisions
Finally, while this is not a recommendation for the FDA per
se, it is time for Congress to reinstate the FDAMA's safe harbors or
190 Marc A. Rodwin, Do We Need Stronger Sanctions to Ensure Legal Compliance
By Pharmaceutical Firms?, 70 FOOD DRUG L.J. 435, 436 (2015) (citing Sammy Al-
mashat et al.; Rapidly Increasing Criminal and Civil Monetary Penalties Against
the Pharmaceutical Industry: 1991 to 2010, PUBLIC CITIZEN HEALTH RESEARCH
GROUP (2010),
https://www.citizen.org/documents/rapidlyincreasingcriminalandcivilpenaltie
s.pdf; Sammy Almahsat & Sidney Wolfe, Pharmaceutical Industry Criminal and
Civil Penalties: An Update, PUBLIC CITIZEN HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP (2012),
http://www.citizen.org/documents/20731.pdf) [hereinafter Do We - Need
Stronger Sanctions?].
191Do We Need Stronger Sanctions?, supra note 191, at 436.
192 For a more in depth discussion about sanctions and the reasons they are not
already utilized, see id.
193 Almashat & Wolfe, supra note 191, at 42 (Table 5). The settlements listed be-
tween 1991 and 2012 are not specific to violations under the FDCA, but rather
include an array of violations such as overcharging government health pro-
grams and unlawful promotion. Id. at 14.
194 See Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE
(Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download. The
memorandum includes six key steps for successfully pursuing individual corpo-
rate wrongdoing.
comparable provisions.195 FDAMA § 401 and the FDA's implementing
regulations, collectively the "safe. harbor provisions," outlined cer-
tain conditions under which a pharmaceutical firm could discuss the
off-label uses of an FDA approved drug.196 If the pharmaceutical firm
met the specified conditions, the manufacturer's off-label communi-
cations-specifically its distributed journal articles and reference
publications-would not serve as evidence of the "manufacturer's
intent that the product be used for unapproved uses."197
Without a safe harbor provision, the First Amendment chal-
lenges will only continue to escalate. Although guidance documents
can be beneficial, such documents cannot serve as a replacement for
clear laws and implementing regulations. As illustrated by the deci-
sions in Caronia and Amarin, without clear and binding guidance for
the pharmaceutical industry, courts will be forced to address these
conflicts through First Amendment challenges, an outcome that may
not be favorable to either the FDA or the pharmaceutical industry.
VI. CONCLUSION
Caronia and Amarin reflect the Supreme Court's opinion over
the past three decades, stemming from the decision in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy to the more recent decision in Sorrell.198 During
this time, the Court has consistently opined that the constitutional
protection of the First Amendment outweighs any concern or specu-
lation about well-educated physicians potentially making the wrong
decision.199 Therefore, in striking a balance between preserving the
First Amendment right to commercial speech and protecting the
public health, the FDA must look towards alternative methods for
regulating the health and safety of patients.
195 See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 § 401, Pub. L.
No. 105-115, 11 Stat. 2296, (1997), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
105publll5/pdf/PLAW-105publl15.pdf; see also Good Reprint Practices, supra
note 99.
196 See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 § 401; Good
Reprint Practices, supra note 99.
197 Good Reprint Practices, supra note 99.
198 See supra notes 67-115 and accompanying text
199 See id.
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As briefly discussed in this Note, alternative methods include
clearly defining false or misleading information, creating updated
guidelines for pharmaceutical companies structuring disclosure
statements, monitoring off-label prescription practices, increasing
sanctions on pharmaceutical companies and individuals, and consid-
ering the return of the FDAMA's safe harbor provisions.200 While the-
se suggestions are not exhaustive, they serve to highlight that alter-
native methods for regulating illegal off-label promotion do exist.
The government has a constitutional duty to implement measures
that do not restrict truthful, non-misleading commercial speech.
200 See supra notes 158-198 and accompanying text
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